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66-4444

16 November 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

**SUBJECT: Discussion of Gaps and Deficiencies with the
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board,
Latin American Panel, 15 November 1966**

1. The first briefing of a PFIAB panel on "gaps and deficiencies" took place yesterday in Coyne's office. Present for the PFIAB were Chairman Murphy and Admiral Sides (as well as Gordon Gray, sitting in as Chairman of the Counterintelligence Panel, for about half the time) and Coyne and Ash. [redacted] and I were present for the DCI/CIA. The briefing lasted without break from 10:00 a.m. to 1:15 p.m.

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6. Murphy asked some searching questions about most of the Ambassadors concerned, prefacing this by saying that he wanted our frank assessment of the performance of these individuals vis-a-vis the collection of intelligence. [] answered these questions to Murphy's apparent satisfaction and with an appropriate degree of discretion. I interjected a deliberately somewhat flippant cautionary note by saying that of course our people would deny under oath having made such statements. Mr. Murphy laughed and gave every indication of getting the message on this one.

7. Messrs. [] then proceeded to answer a battery of questions on the [] countries covered in the papers submitted, i.e., []. In addition to the questions on subject and personnel noted above, Murphy reverted several times to particular points. These included the status of audio operations; arrangements for [] reporting in the event of drastically changed conditions; the targeting and quality of Embassy reporting; and the coverage by []. On this latter point the Agency representatives explained that potential opposition groups are reluctant to confide their plans to [] for fear of invoking repressive action on the part of the U.S. They indicated that this is the principal reason why clandestine reporting is much more likely to produce reliable information on projected coups than is overt collection. The PFIAB members felt that this might indicate a general weakness in the U.S. policy posture.

8. Mr. Gray commented that it seemed to him, in his capacity as Chairman of the Counterintelligence Panel, that there is insufficient priority on CI matters in the intelligence community, and asked whether enough money was being allocated to this. I said that in this field money is much less an important factor than are adequately trained personnel, the development of appropriate techniques, support mechanisms, etc. I referred him to the roundup of CIA and DIA activities directed against Soviet Bloc installations, which had been sent to the Board in response to a recommendation stemming from the Gray-Coyne trip to Scandinavia. He had not seen this, but Coyne told him it was waiting in his folder for him. I commended this also to Mr. Murphy's particular attention.

9. During a discussion of coverage of internal communications Murphy showed some unfamiliarity with the subject, whereupon Coyne said that people in the community had been talking for years

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about taking an over-all look at matters of this kind, but nothing was ever done. I told the group about the work that has been going on in the SIGINT Committee, and particularly the Intelligence Guidance Subcommittee, along these lines. I said that a great deal of progress had been made over the last year or two and that, as Coyne knew, USIB had recently taken definitive action on Latin America in particular. He professed never to have heard of any of this, but Murphy seemed most interested. (I later had the appropriate USIB reference called to Coyne's attention.)

10. Sides and Murphy inquired about the coverage of possible missiles in Cuba, especially the adequacy of reconnaissance. I told them that this was now considered to be more than adequate and that steps were being taken to reduce the coverage within acceptable limits. In this connection Mr. Brown explained the continuing look that CIA and DIA take at the information bearing on this problem.



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cc: DCI
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